This paper constructs an equilibrium model of entrepreneurial innovation where individuals di®er in their attitude toward uncertainty. Unlike previous models of innovation, the¯rm-formation process is endogenous. An entrepreneur, who owns residual pro¯ts, utilizes an uncertain technology and hires a worker who may only be partially isolated from uncertainty. While the available production technologies are exogenously speci¯ed, the technologies that operate in equilibrium are endogenous, depending on both the entrepreneur's prior beliefs about the pro¯tability of the technology, as well as the worker's willingness to work with the uncertain technology. The general equilibrium setting allows us to explore the impact of innovation on the nature of the¯rm. The relationship between technological uncertainty and the nature of the¯rm is able to explain the commonly observed S-shaped di®usion pro¯le. As uncertainty falls,¯rms evolve from being entrepreneurial to corporate, nally becoming bureaucratic.
Introduction
With a burgeoning dot-com entrepreneurial class fuelling technological expansion, growth and dizzying market cycles, innovative entrepreneurship has captured the interest of policy-makers. Tales { apocryphal and otherwise { of entrepreneurs such as Microsoft's Bill Gates and Apple's Steve Jobs, who launched new¯rms in untried and uncertain industries, spur others to seek their own fortunes through entrepreneurial innovation. Behind these start-ups is a visionary entrepreneur, who abandons his safe job and stakes all on the success of the°edgling enterprise. Such innovations are poorly captured in the economics literature, which has tended to consider a more cautious type of innovation, where existing¯rms enter new, but closely related, markets. Concepts such as \leadership" and the \entrepreneurial vision" of individuals { which are central to the management literature on innovation { are largely absent from these economic models, despite the signi¯cant impact that a handful of individuals have had in shaping the new technology of developed economies. 1 The present paper has two objectives. The¯rst is to construct an equilibrium model of innovation and¯rm formation in the presence of uncertainty, and propose a new equilibrium concept which is suitable for studying commodity innovation. Although the economy is a stripped-down a®air, with an emphasis on the labor markets, it o®ers a simple and°exible model of entrepreneurial innovation and di®usion where agents di®er in their attitude to uncertainty.
The second objective is to integrate the literature on the entrepreneurial¯rm with that on the di®usion of innovations; re-establishing the entrepreneur as central to understanding the process of¯rm formation and innovation. We show that innovation proof equilibria, can aid us in understanding real-world phenomena such as the S-shaped di®usion curve.
By innovation, we mean the implementation of a new productive technology: either a new method of production for an existing product, or the production of an entirely new product. Standard models in the Arrow-Debreu spirit, exogenously specify the commodities that will be marketed, therefore precluding the role of an entrepreneur as an innovator.
Innovative enterprises will typically exhibit highly uncertain pro¯tability, in the Knightian (1921) sense. Therefore, the attitude of agents to situations where outcomes are governed by stochastic processes without objective probabilities is central to understanding the motivation for innovation. As Schumpeter (1947, p.152) argues: \It is in most cases only one man or a few men who see the new possibility and are able to cope with the resistance and di±culties which action always meets with outside the rut of established practice."
In the Bayesian world of subjective expected utility (SEU), agents arbitrarily choose a single distribution from those consistent with the available information, reducing objective uncertainty to subjective risk. However, decision-makers might instead prefer to adopt an holistic view of the set of possible distributions, and incorporate all of them into the decision-making process 2 . In our framework, agents follow the latter approach. They utilize either the upper or lower envelope of the set of distributions to guide their decisions. 3 We designate the former type Bulls, and their more timid counterparts bears.
This deviation from Bayesianism is undertaken for several reasons. First, evidence against the descriptive realism of SEU is now legion. 4 Second, the framework of Dempster (1967) allows the uncertainty of a process to be speci¯ed using exogenous \parameters". This facilitates comparative statics exercises. We can vary the degree of uncertainty surrounding a new technology to examine its e®ects on equilibrium. Since the process of innovation di®usion inevitably leads to uncertainty reductions, this feature of the model is extremely useful for studying di®usion. Finally, our model of behavior allows us to de¯ne \optimism" and \pessimism" in the face of uncertainty in a consistent way. A Bull, for example, is optimistic in a consistent fashion about the outcome of any uncertain process in any market of any economy. An SEU decision-maker's degree of \optimism" must be separately speci¯ed with respect to every distinct uncertain process. Thus, we can study an in¯nite range of di®erent economies using only our two types of agent { Bulls and bears { which greatly simpli¯es the analysis.
In our model, the uncertainty attitude of the individual is central to innovation. There are a continuum of agents, a fraction ® of whom are Bulls, and a¯nite number of production technologies, summarized by reduced-form stochastic revenue functions. However, there is no exogenous speci¯cation of¯rms. Any agent may choose to start a¯rm using any of the available technologies. Each¯rm employs a single worker. Employer liability is limited, however, so wages may not be fully paid in all states. Each technology has its own labor market, since the wage default contingencies may vary across two¯rms o®ering the same wage but using di®erent technologies. Agents choose which labor market to participate in, and which side to take.
The inclusion of entrepreneurship and¯rm formation into a standard GE framework provides a particular challenge. All agents are assumed to be price takers in those markets with a non-zero density of participants, and wages must clear all markets simultaneously. However, in addition, the equilibrium must be innovation-proof. Since the singular role of the innovative entrepreneur is to establish a new (labor) market, it is meaningless to speak of an equilibrium wage rate for that market, which the entrepreneur takes as given. Instead, the entrepreneur must assess for herself the wage o®ers that are su±cient to attract a worker from his current job into the new enterprise. Therefore, an equilibrium is innovation-proof if it is not possible for an entrepreneur to start a¯rm with a new (currently unused) technology, pay a wage adequate to attract a worker, and generate an expected return that improves upon her own equilibrium utility. Hence, in equilibrium, all pro¯table entrepreneurial opportunities have been exploited. Therefore, innovation requires the existence of an entrepreneur and a worker who are willing to share the uncertainties of the new enterprise in a manner which improves on the next-best occupational options of both. Indeed, the existence of a new technology, even if not taken up, can in°uence wages in other industries, as existing labor markets absorb the pressure presented by the new entrepreneurial option now available to all agents. This phenomena is in fact observed in the dot-com sector, where there is pressure on employers to retain sta® by paying higher salaries and matching the working conditions of start-ups, such as casual dress codes and 2 Compare with the methodology of robust Bayesian inference discussed in Huber (1981) 3 See Dempster (1967) . 4 See Camerer (1995) for a survey.
greater work°exibility. As one journal notes \with barriers to entry crumbling, easier access to capital for start-ups and support networks for new businesses in place, savvy employees have never been so empowered". 5 In other words, the existence of new technology improves the outside options of workers in an established industry. The notion of an \innovation-proof entrepreneurial equilibrium", presented in section 3, is able to capture this e®ect.
Our focus on individual heterogeneity in attitudes to uncertainty re°ects both the popular notion of the innovative entrepreneur as someone who is less averse to uncertainty, as well as the views of economists such as Schumpeter (1928) , who suggest that innovation is fuelled by a distinct type of person, who takes pleasure in \doing what has not been done before" (ibid., p.380). In a recent NZ study, Pinfold (1998) observes that only 42.5% of start-up ventures established in NZ during 1988 and 1989 survived for¯ve years or more. However, a 1997 survey of start-up owners revealed that: \They rated the chances of their business surviving its¯rst¯ve years at 75.7%, which was 23.5% higher than they rated the chances of similar start-ups." (ibid., p.1) Clearly, optimism in the face of uncertainty seems characteristic of such entrepreneurs.
Branson, the founder of Virgin Records and Virgin Airlines, is an archetypal innovative entrepreneur. He claims that being an adventurer and an entrepreneur are similar, in that both are \willing to go where most people wouldn't dare". 6 However, he dismisses the notion that they are risk-seekers, claiming instead that they are more comfortable than most with uncertainty. The psychology literature (surveyed in WÄ arneryd (1988)) supports this view. It reveals that owner-managers exhibit levels of risk aversion which are not signi¯cantly lower than those of salaried managers, leading psychologists to speculate that any di®erences between the two groups may indeed lie in the perception of non-objective risks (uncertainties).
Having recognized the importance of uncertainty to the individual, the challenge is to determine its impact on the innovative behavior of¯rms. Traditionally,¯rm objectives have been considered separately from the decision to innovate. Jensen (1982) considers the manner in which heterogeneous prior beliefs of¯rms can explain an S-shaped di®usion curve. We depart from this convention by allowing the¯rm's objective to arise from the attitude of the entrepreneur and worker. This enables us to examine the interactions between the nature of the technology that is operated, and the characteristics of members of the¯rm who operate the technology. The latter determines what \sort" of¯rm it is: its objectives and mode of operation. As Drµ eze (1985, p.5) points out,¯rms, unlike human beings, have no \visceral reaction to uncertainty". He argues that in the face of uncertainty and incomplete markets, the objectives of the¯rm need to be induced from the objectives of the owners and workers. While Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979) and others have recognized this in single technology models, its added signi¯cance in economies with multiple technologies does not appear to be fully appreciated. Access to jobs in¯rms employing other technologies means that workers must tacitly agree to the¯rm's objectives, even if not explicitly bearing any of the uncertainty. An employer, for example, might personally prefer a highly uncertain enterprise about which they are extremely optimistic, but choose to run a more cautious one due to the lack of potential workers who share their optimism (or demand an exorbitant wage to in order to buy into the entrepreneur's \folly").
Indeed, after the crash of dot-com stocks, internet companies reported di±culty recruiting workers, and many hurried to eliminate \dot-com" from their names. 7 As workers in these companies found themselves facing redundancies, recruitment consultants in the industry recommend that \job hunters act like venture capitalists and evaluate prospective employers' business plans. This means not just looking at the job itself, but also taking stock of how experienced the leaders are, what level of competition the company faces, how deep its pockets are and whether the company has any unique value to bring to the market beyond an advertising campaign." 8 Many dot-com ideas are thought to°ounder, not for want of entrepreneurial vision, but for want of workers who share that vision. Indeed, it is often observed that when a¯rm changes its \strategic direction" executives often leave the¯rm, because of their lack of con¯dence in the new direction. In our model, one of the costs of innovating is hiring workers willing to work in a highly uncertain industry.
The evolution of new industries in practice closely re°ects Schumpeter's ideas on innovation and di®usion. The familiar pattern of an S-shaped di®usion curve, where the adoption rate of new technology is initially slow and then becomes more rapid as the industry evolves, has been discussed by a number of authors, who o®er a variety of explanations as to why some¯rms wait before adopting a new technology, while others jump in early. We show that an S-shaped di®usion pro¯le can be motivated by the changing objectives of the¯rm. We argue that as uncertainty is resolved, the very nature of entrepreneurship and the employment relationship changes.
Firms utilizing new technology move through three distinct phases. If uncertainty is sufciently large, then it pervades the whole organization, with workers and employers a®ected alike. These infant industries are characterized by owners and workers who share a similar optimism in the new industry { both owners and workers are Bulls { and share the expected pro¯ts equally. We label this¯rm entrepreneurial, since it has a number of the hall-marks of new ventures and start-ups, where workers are remunerated through options and are driven by the same vision as the owner.
As the new industry matures and the chances of success are known more precisely, more staid and cautious bears enter the market as workers, which radically alters changes the nature of thē rm. The new structure may be described as corporate. Only the owners are optimists, while the workers are cautious types whose wage contract shields them from much of the uncertainty. Hence, in comparison to an entrepreneurial¯rm, the Bullish owners of the corporate enterprise face lower labor costs. The corporate structure gives owners additional surplus in exchange for bearing extra uncertainty.
The switch to the corporate phase provides added impetus to di®usion. Bulls are freed up from labor duties to start new¯rms; a greater proportion of the population is able to e®ectively participate in the innovative sector; and wages are reduced, as bears o®er cheaper labor than Bulls, whose optimistic views about the returns to¯rm ownership imply a higher reservation wage. This corresponds to the steep part of the di®usion curve.
As uncertainty falls further, we eventually enter a third phase in which bears are happy to take on the role of¯rm ownership in the new sector. This new type of¯rm, with pessimists at all levels is referred to as bureaucratic.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economy and the decisionmaking framewor we employ. Section 3 is the more technical part of the paper;¯rst, we de¯ne an equilibrium and show it exists under failry mild conditions; then we introduce innovationproof equilibria, and show they exist under no additional requirements. Section 4 discusses some properties of innovation-proof equilibria. Section 5 discusses di®usion of innovations in our economy. Section 6 concludes.
The Entrepreneurial Economy
The entrepreneurial economy consists of several industries. An industry's production function will be more-or-less suppressed in the analysis. Each industry's income possibilities are subject to risk, although agents are not fully informed about this process. Therefore, the attitude of agents to situations where outcomes are governed by stochastic processes with vague information is central to understanding the motivation for innovation.
Decision making under uncertainty
There is a¯nite set £ of payo®-relevant states. To describe the uncertainty surrounding the realization of the payo®-relevant state, we introduce a set S of fundamental states, endowed with a ¾{algebra § and a commonly known probability measure p S . We take S to be the unit interval [0; 1], § the usual Borel ¾{algebra on S, and p S the Lebesgue measure on (S; §), unless otherwise speci¯ed. The payo®{relevant states are related to the fundamental states by a measurable information correspondence ¡ : S ³ £. If fundamental state s is realized, the available information implies that the payo®{relevant state is some µ 2 ¡(s), but nothing else is known about the relative likelihoods of states in ¡(s). Hence, if ¡ is singleton-valued (a function), then knowledge of p S and ¡ implies a commonly known probability on £. Otherwise, the available information about the stochastic process by which payo®-relevant states are realized may be too vague to yield a well-de¯ned probability.
Example 1 Suppose that £ = fµ 1 ; µ 2 ; µ 3 g and de¯ne ¡ as follows:
What is the probability of event fµ 1 g? One can identify a lower and upper bound, ¤ guarantees the realization of µ 1 , while s 2 ¡ 2 3 ; 1 ¤ precludes it. However, there is no basis for choosing any particular point in this interval as being uniquely \correct". Similarly, one can identify lower and upper bounds for any other subset of £.
This formalization of vagueness of information is due to Dempster (1967) . 9 Because the source and structure of uncertainty is precisely speci¯ed, one can examine the comparative static e®ects of changes to the nature or degree of this uncertainty. For example, if ¡(s) µ¡(s) for all s 2 S, then it is natural to say that ¡ describes a situation involving less uncertainty than¡.
Following Dempster, we say the collection of upper bounds for subsets of £ induced by ¡ is the upper probability on f£; P(£)g, and the collection of lower bounds is the lower probability. 10 Formally, the upper probability of event E 2 P(£) is given by
and the lower probability is
Unless ¡ is a function, these objects need not be probabilities because they may violate the usual additivity condition. They are examples of a more general class of objects called capacities, which were extensively studied by Choquet (1953-4) . When ¡ is singleton-valued, the upper and lower probabilities coincide, and their common value is an ordinary probability measure.
Example 1 (continued) The lower probability of fµ 1 g is 1 3 , that of fµ 2 ; µ 3 g is similarly 1 3 , while the lower probability of £ is 1. This illustrates the fact that lower probabilities are superadditive. Conversely, the upper probabilities of fµ 1 g and fµ 2 ; µ 3 g are 2 3 , illustrating that upper probabilities are subadditive. For a full characterization of the properties of these capacities, see Chateauneuf and Ja®ray (1989) , Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) .
Upper and lower probabilities may also usefully be described by their MÄ obius inverse(see Chateauneuf and Ja®ray (1989) and Shafer (1976) ). This inverse is the mapping m : P(£) ! [0; 1] de¯ned as follows
Thus, m is the probability induced by p S on the power set P(£). Furthermore:
Let f : £ ! R be a random variable with range fr 1 ; r 2 ; : : : ; r n g, indexed such that r 1 < r 2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < r k . How do agents evaluate these potentially vague revenue lotteries? Dempster 9 See also Mukerji (1997) for a useful discussion in the context of economic decision-making. 10 P(£) denotes the power set of £; i.e. the set of all subsets of £.
(1967) suggests employing the Choquet integral. De¯ne E i = f ¡1 (r i ), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. The Choquet expected value of f with respect to the capacity v is
When v is additive (i.e. a probability measure) this is equivalent to a standard expected value calculation. For general capacities v, the Choquet integral satis¯es the condition
for arbitrary random variable f and constants a and b. However, it will not be the case in general that
A su±cient condition for additivity of the Choquet expectation operator is comonotonicity of f and g (Schmeidler (1986) ). The variables f and g are comonotonic if there do not exist states µ; µ 0 2 £ such that f(µ) > f(µ 0 ) and g(µ) < g(µ 0 ).
Bulls and bears
We assume that all agents are risk neutral: that is, their objective is to maximize the Choquet expected value of their income. We also assume there are two types of agents: Bulls and bears. When calculating Choquet expectations, Bulls employ the upper probability, and bears employ the lower probability induced by ¡ on f£; P(£)g. 11 For any random variable f : £ ! R, denote by Ef its Choquet expectation with respect to the upper probability, and by Ef its Choquet expectation with respect to the lower probability. Observe in particular that Ef¸Ef for any f. Bulls and bears clearly have beliefs which are equally consistent with the underlying information structure, but Bulls choose to interpret the available information in a more optimistic fashion than bears. Finally, let us o®er one further perspective on this decision-making process. The set of additive probabilities on f£; P(£)g that are consistent with p S and ¡ is known as the core of the lower probability v. 12 Formally,
where ¢(£) denotes the set of all additive probability measures on f£; P(£)g. A natural de¯nition of Bullish optimism from this perspective would be the tendency to evaluate any random variable f : £ ! R by calculating its expected value using the most \favorable" probability from core(v). In fact, such a de¯nition of Bullish preferences is entirely consistent with our model, as it is well known that
Similarly:
Given the unfamiliarity of most economists with the process of Choquet integration, this alternative characterization of Bullish and bearish preferences can be a comforting aid to one's intuitive understanding of their behavior. For example, if ¡(s) µ¡(s) for all s 2 S, then, in obvious notation, core(v) µ core(v). That is, the core shrinks as uncertainty reduces, which is what one would expect. This causes bearish and Bullish behavior to converge.
The Economy
The economy consists of a continuum of agents, divided into Bulls and bears, and I industries. Agents simultaneously choose occupations based on common information about the processes determining revenues in the various industries, a given vector of industry wage rates, and common expectations about the equilibrium densities of¯rms in each industry. Each industry's production function will be more-or-less suppressed in the analysis. We are also not specifically interested in contracting within the¯rm 13 . As Baumol (1968 Baumol ( , 1993 points out, the entrepreneurial function is distinct from the managerial one. The latter is more concerned with day-to-day matters such as¯ne-tuning the input mix in production. These decisions are concealed within a reduced form revenue function and a simplifying assumption that each¯rm hires precisely one worker. 14 A¯rm's revenue depends on the density of¯rms in each industry plus some stochastic factors. Formally, the revenue function of a¯rm in industry i is R i (µ; ±), where µ 2 £ is the payo®-relevant state, and ± is a vector of densities, ± i being the total density of¯rms in industry i. Since each¯rm hires exactly one worker, the density ± i of¯rms in industry i is an element of £ 0;
1 2 ¤ . The object of our analysis is the following abstract economy.
De¯nition 1 An economy is an object
(S; §; p S ); (£; P(£)); ¡;
13 Kelsey and Spanjers (1997) focus on this issue. 14 By contrast, Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979) explicitly include a managerial decision about the number of workers to hire. It should also be noted that decisions about the internal organisation of the¯rm arguably fall on the boundary between the managerial and entrepreneurial function, as these determine how information is processed and uncertainty managed within the¯rm. Our simpli¯ed¯rm structure ignores these issues. Addressing them is a matter demanding further attention in future research.
where (i) ¡ is a measurable correspondence from S to £; (ii) R i gives the revenue of a typical rm in industry i when it hires exactly one worker; and (iii) ® 2 [0; 1] divides the unit interval into Bulls, agents with indices in the sub-interval [0; ®), and bears, agents with indices in the sub-interval [®; 1].
Revenues
The revenue function summarizes all input choices other than the hiring of the single worker. It also summarizes the process of output price determination. With a continuum of¯rms, the most natural assumption is that¯rms are price-takers on these output markets, and prices are set to match aggregate demand to the supply implied by the vector ±. However, strategic interaction within or across industries in the determination of output prices is also compatible with the model.
Note that R i depends on the entire vector of industry densities. It is natural to suppose that R i is weakly decreasing in ± i . If di®erent industries produce substitute goods, or if there is a¯xed consumer pool for which all I industries compete, then R i may also be weakly decreasing in each ± j . However, complementarity of inter-industry demand systems can also be accommodated.
An important special case in which it is natural to think of R i decreasing in each ± j occurs when the model is used to describe I producers of di®erentiated products within the same industry. This interpretation allows us to consider issues of product innovations within an industry, as opposed to the innovative introduction of an entirely new product category.
We shall make the following technical assumption throughout:
Assumption 1 Each R i is bounded and is also continuous in ±.
This assumption is needed to guarantee existence of equilibria { see Theorem 3.1. Given a density vector ±, industry i's revenue is a random variable on f£; P(£)g. Note that although each revenue function R i is expressed as a function of the same µ, this does not imply that each is subject to the same uncertainty. 15 For example, it may be that µ 2 R I , and for each i, the value of R i is independent of µ j for every j 6 = i. In this case, the uncertainty in industry i depends on the precision of the available information about the ith component of µ, and this may be quite di®erent to the uncertainty surrounding the jth component. For example, one might wish to distinguish \established" industries, whose stochastic revenues are known precisely, from currently inactive industries (potential innovations) for which there is great uncertainty about pro¯tability. Our framework allows this distinction to be modelled in a natural way.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, labor markets clear, and the density of¯rms in each industry is required to match agents' common expectations. The latter is analogous to the more familiar assumption that agents correctly anticipate output prices in the various output markets. However, as our interest is in the supply side { labor markets and¯rm formation { we suppress these output prices in the analysis. 16 Each agent in an economy E has 2I occupational options: wage-earning or¯rm ownership in one of the I industries. An agent selects exactly one occupation: they cannot divide their time among a portfolio of jobs. In each industry i,¯rm owners obey the following:
Assumption 2 Each owner employs one worker. An employment contract speci¯es a wage level w i¸0 and the following limited liability clause: if state µ 2 £ is realized, the entrepreneur pays the worker
The limited liability clause implies that wage earning need not generate a sure income. 17 To evaluate returns from the various occupational options, agents need to know the vector w = (w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w I ) of equilibrium wage rates for each industry, and the equilibrium vector of industry densities ± = (± 1 ; ± 2 ; : : : ; ± I ): For given values of w and ±, agents choose occupations that maximize their Choquet expected income. In making these calculations, bears employ the lower probability, and Bulls the upper probability.
Given (w; ±), a Bull obtains utility
from owning a¯rm in industry i, and utility
from being a wage-laborer in the same industry. The utility obtained by bears from these occupations may be described similarly. Let O = f1; 2; : : : ; 2Ig be a set of indices for occupations in E. We shall index the occupation of being a¯rm owner in industry i by (2i ¡ 1) 2 O, and the occupation of being a wage earner in industry i by 2i 2 O.
De¯nition 2 Given an economy E and vectors (w; ±), the Bulls' optimal occupation set BR E;B (w; ±) µ O is the set of occupations that maximize a Bull's Choquet expected income. The bears' optimal occupation set BR E;b (w; ±) µ O is de¯ned similarly.
In addition to the vectors (w; ±), an equilibrium must also specify the occupation of each agent. This is described using an allocation function.
De¯nition 3 An allocation function for the economy E is a Lebesgue measurable function
De¯nition 4 The triplet (w; ±; Á) is an entrepreneurial equilibrium of E if
for each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig.
Thus, an entrepreneurial equilibrium speci¯es wages, industry densities and individual occupations such that, when all agents anticipate (w; ±) and each chooses his or her occupation optimally, all labor markets clear and the common expectations of ± are con¯rmed. It is quite possible that some industries fail to operate in equilibrium: that is, the vector ± may have some zero components. Hence, the equilibrium endogenously determines which industries operate (for example, which innovations are implemented), as well as the wage rates and¯rm densities in each operating industry.
Theorem 3.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every economy E has an equilibrium (w; ±; Á).
Proof: Let © (w; ±) denote the set of allocation functions for E consistent with (w; ±). Denote the associated set of occupational density vectors as
Notice that elements of Z (w; ±) belong to the unit simplex ¢ 2I¡1 µ R 2I + . Now let us de¯ne the 2I £ 2I matrix C = [c ij ] as follows:
Letting 19 X (w; ±) = C Z (w; ±), we see that each x 2 X (w; ±) is a 2I-vector whose¯rst I components give the net excess density of owners in each industry associated with some allocation consistent with (w; ±), and whose second I components give the total density of owners in each industry associated with the same consistent allocation. This transformation induces a oneto-one mapping between Z (w; ±) and X (w; ±) since C is non-singular. Alternatively, one can recover z 2 Z (w; ±) from x = Cz 2 X (w; ±). Therefore, X (w; ±) is a subset of B := C¢ 2I¡1 . Next, extend each R i to the domain £ £ [0; 1] I as follows:
In (iii), Leb denotes Lebesgue measure.
19 To interpret the following transformation, assume that points in Euclidean space are column vectors.
These extended R i functions are still strictly positive, and continue to satisfy Assumption 3. In particular, since the extended functions are bounded, we may de¯ne
For arbitrary vectors y 2 R 2I , let proj I y denote the projection of y onto its¯rst I components; and proj ¡I y the projection of y onto its second I components. Then one may observe that One can easily verify that » is well-de¯ned on its domain, and that its range is contained in D.
To see that any¯xed point of » determines an equilibrium of E, suppose that (w; ±; Á) 2 » (w; ±; Á). We must therefore have
Then, su±ces to show that
since (3) implies that all labor markets can clear given expectations (w; ±). From (2), we thus obtain that ± gives the corresponding vector of industry densities (which coincides, by (3), with the vector of owner densities). Finally, (3) and (2) jointly imply that
as required. Hence, (w; ±; Á) is an equilibrium for any Á 2 © (w; ±) generating x. We now verify that (3) holds. Suppose instead that x (I) i > 0 for some i. The de¯nition of » and the fact that (w; ±; Á) is a¯xed point imply w i = W . But then all agents strictly prefer being wage-earners in industry i than being¯rm owners in industry i. This follows because R i is strictly positive by assumption: no matter how pessimistic agents' beliefs, wage-earners in industry i must expect a strictly positive income when w i = W . Since x 2 X (w; ±), this means x (I) i · 0, which is a contradiction. Assuming x (I) i < 0 leads to a contradiction by a symmetric argument. Equation (3) is therefore con¯rmed.
Summarising, we de¯ned the correspondence » : D ¶ D, and deduced that for any¯xed point (w; ±; x), there is a Á such that (w; ±; Á) is an equilibrium of E. The¯nal step is to show that » does indeed have a¯xed point. But » satis¯es all the conditions of Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. The arguments are somewhat lengthy, and may be found in Appendix A. This completes the proof.
2
Discussion of the equilibrium concept
Unfortunately, De¯nition 4 is not entirely satisfactory as it stands. In particular, it may preclude innovation on the basis of irrational expectations about labor costs. Suppose, for example, that ± i = 0 in equilibrium. How do we interpret the common wage expectation w i ? A potential entrant into industry i would presumably assess the wage costs of operating in that industry to be equal to the minimum wage necessary to attract some other agent away from his or her current occupation. However, there is no reason why w i should correspond to this wage rate in general.
Example 3 Let the fundamental state space be S = S 1 [ S 2 , where S 1 and S 2 are disjoint, and de¯ne the information mapping
with payo®-relevant state space £ = fµ 1 ; µ 2 ; µ 3 g Finally, assume the measure p S satis¯es p S (S j ) = 1 2 for each j 2 f1; 2g. Thus, the lower and upper probabilities of the event fµ 1 g are both 1 2 ; while events fµ 2 g and fµ 3 g each have lower probability 0, and upper probability 1 2 . Consider a two industry economy (I = 2) with revenue functions R i (µ k ; ±) = 1 i; k 2 f1; 2g R 1 (µ 3 ; ±) = 4 and R 2 (µ 3 ; ±) = 9 2 Thus,¯rm density has no impact on revenue, and industry 2 weakly dominates industry 1 as a generator of revenue.
Suppose agents anticipate the following wages and densities:
We claim that (ŵ;±; Á) is an equilibrium for the allocation function Á which assigns all Bulls to¯rm ownership in industry 1, and all bears to be workers in industry 1. To see why, observe that
So BR E;B (ŵ;±) = f1; 4g and BR E;b (ŵ;±) = f2; 4g.
However, an equilibrium in which industry 2 does not operate seems a matter for concern. Suppose an enterprising Bull from the above equilibrium contemplates closing her current rm in industry 1 and opening a monopoly in industry 2. This Bull could o®er her current (industry 1) worker the chance to work in the new enterprise for a wage ofw 2 = 1. The worker will be happy to accept, as the o®ered wage provides precisely the same expected income as he is currently earning in industry 1. The Bull owner of the industry 2 monopoly anticipates a pro¯t of
which strictly exceeds her current expected pro¯t in industry 1.
Part of the problem lies with the standard de¯nition of equilibrium. As noted by Makowski (1980) in a di®erent context, the standard notion of Walrasian equilibrium is not entirely satisfactory when the commodoties sold in equilibrium are determined endogenously. In that framework, the prices of \non-produced" commodities are free to be anything. On the other hand, some of these prices may leave incentives for¯rms to open the corresponding market and starting the production of that particular good. In that framework, Makowski de¯ned a \full walrasion equilibrium" as the case in which this pro¯t-making opportunities to innovation are absent. In the following, we impose an equilibrium re¯nement in a similar spirit.
Innovation-Proofness
Equilibria which leave such pro¯table opportunities unexploited are clearly unacceptable. Definition 5 re¯nes the equilibrium concept to eliminate such possibilities. It requires that no lucrative entrepreneurial opportunity is left unexploited.
De¯nition 5 Consider an economy E, and let (w; ±; Á) be an entrepreneurial equilibrium of E. This equilibrium is innovation-proof if there does not exist an industry i with ± i = 0, a potential entrepreneur k 2 [0; 1], a potential worker k 0 2 [0; 1] (k 6 = k 0 ), and a wage level
is no less than the utility k 0 obtains from his current occupation Á(k 0 ) (where v k 0 denotes the capacity of agent k 0 ); and
strictly exceeds the utility k obtains from her current occupation Á(k) (where v k denotes the capacity of agent k).
The concept of innovation-proofness represents a conceptual modi¯cation of the standard logic of price-taking equilibrium. Potential innovators are assumed not only to know the wages in existing industries, but also the reservation wage necessary to start a¯rm in any new industry. The (unmodelled) process by which this reservation wage information is promulgated within a market economy is clearly di®erent to the (unmodelled) process by which wages in currently active labor markets are made known.
Formulating conjectures about reservation wages in inactive labor markets is fundamental to the process of innovative entrepreneurship. However, unlike writers in the Austrian tradition such as Kirzner, we do not di®erentiate agents in terms of their ability to formulate accurate conjectures of this sort (their \alertness" to entrepreneurial opportunity). Instead, we assume that all agents have perfect knowledge of reservation wage levels in all potential industries, and equal awareness of the revenue functions of inactive industries. Relaxation of this assumption may be useful, but is beyond the scope of the present paper. Innovation in our model is therefore driven not by di®erences in agents' awareness of the entrepreneurial opportunities, but by di®erences in their responses to the uncertainties that may surround revenue levels in new industries.
In summary, innovation-proofness ensures that equilibria are robust to lucrative innovations when all agents have equal access to information about potential revenue functions, and assess the implicit wage rates in inactive industries at the reservation wage of the \cheapest" potential worker.
The following Theorem veri¯es the internal consistency of our model.
Theorem 3.2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, every economy E possesses an innovation-proof entrepreneurial equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Optimism and occupational choice
Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979) (henceforth KL79) obtained a psychological pro¯le of entrepreneurs as the less risk-averse members of the community. We have already mentioned that this psychological characterization does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Moreover, KL79 employs a model with only a single technology (labor market), and in which wages must be paid with certainty, out of the employer's personal resources if necessary. Neither assumption is realistic, and both seriously hamper the model's capacity to say anything about entrepreneurial innovation. The identity of entrepreneurs, and in particular of innovators, will depend in potentially complex ways on general equilibrium pressures in a multi-technology economy, and on the institutional framework in which labor contracting takes place. Indeed, in La®ont (1982, 1983) , the earlier (negative) correlation between risk aversion and entrepreneurship is lost through the introduction of a richer contracting framework.
The present model departs slightly from KL79's labor market institutions, by allowing wage default. This re°ects the obvious fact that employees in new start-ups may often face as much uncertainty as the owner { if the¯rm fails, all are out of pocket. However, we refrain from introducing more°exible contracting arrangements, as our focus is on the general equilibrium e®ects from the existence of multiple technologies. 20 Despite the uncertainties of wage labor, it remains true in our model that Bulls have a greater a±nity for¯rm ownership, and bears a greater propensity towards wage-earning roles. More precisely:
Lemma 4.1 (a) If bears prefer to be¯rm owners rather than workers, so do Bulls. Formally:
(b) If Bulls prefer to be workers rather than¯rm owners, so do bears. Formally:
Neither converse is true in general.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that R i (µ; ±) ¡ minfw i ; R i (µ; ±)g, minfw i ; R i (µ; ±)g and 2 minfw i ; R i (µ; ±)g are pairwise comonotone. Hence
if and only if
Therefore, using (6), it follows that (4) implies
which is equivalent to
This proves (a). Case (b) is proved in similar fashion. Counter-examples to the converses are easy to construct. ¤ An obvious corollary of Lemma 4.1 is that when I = 1 and ® 2 (0; 1), there will always be some Bulls who own¯rms and some bears allocated to laboring jobs in an entrepreneurial equilibrium (unless relevant uncertainty is absent; e.g. ¡ is a function). 21 This is the analogue of KL79's result on entrepreneurial psychology. Hence, our focus on uncertainty rather than risk, and our Assumption 2 do not, on their own, cause signi¯cant departures from KL79. However, when embedded in our multi-technology general equilibrium model, they do have interesting implications for the process of innovation di®usion. We shall illustrate these implications via an example in the next section.
21 >From the proof of Lemma 4.1, relevant uncertainty is present provided E [R1(µ; ±) ¡ 2 minfw1; R1(µ; ±)g] > E [R1(µ; ±) ¡ 2 minfw1; R1(µ; ±)g] :
Uncertainty and the di®usion of innovations
Much of the existing literature on innovation is concerned with the process of di®usion of new products and techniques. An aspect of this process which is discussed by a number of existing models is the e®ects of uncertainty reduction on di®usion. As¯rms innovate, they release information about their novel product or technology. This reduces the uncertainty surrounding the value of the innovation, and hence will tend to promote or discourage further \innovators", depending on the nature of the information released. Jensen (1982) and Vettas (1998) are notable examples. In the latter paper, entry leads to learning by both potential suppliers and consumers, and therefore facilitates further entry. In Vettas, however,¯rms are exogenously given, with no role for the entrepreneur. The learning on the consumer side is by observing other consumers buying the same good twice. For example, as he suggests in footnote 4, the e®ect of observing ones neighbor purchasing a car the second time around has an e®ect. However, the reliance on this sort of signal means that learning will often be very slow since consumer durables tend to have a high life expectancy.
Schumpeter, for example, saw entrepreneurs as pioneers into uncertain endeavors, whose e®orts cleared a path along which \swarms" of more conservative business-people would follow, should the reconnaissance reports prove favorable. This accords well with the empirical evidence of S-shaped di®usion curves for successful innovations. However, it also posits both a mechanism of di®usion (uncertainty reduction), and a central agent (the innovative entrepreneur) driving the process. The combined role of uncertainty and entrepreneurship has been given scant attention in the formal theoretical literature on di®usion.
Dempster's model of uncertainty is ideally suited to¯lling this gap. When the graph of ¡ is properly contained in that of ¡ 0 , then the former represents a situation of less uncertainty than the latter. This allows us to study the e®ects of uncertainty reduction on equilibrium.
Importantly, the preferences of each agent may be consistently de¯ned across these uncertaintyordered economies: Bulls continue to use the upper { and bears the lower { envelope of the (shrinking) set of probabilities generated by the information correspondences. Under a Bayesian model of behavior, such as SEU, individuals choose a single probability from this set. If the set shrinks so as to exclude their chosen probability, then a new probability { hence entirely new preferences { must be speci¯ed.
Let us therefore consider a simple example of the di®usion of a successful innovation. Set I = 2, and de¯ne £ = f1; 2g, R 1 (µ; ±) = 10 ¡ 2± 1 and
Technology 1, which we may think of as the basis for a well-established industry, exhibits no uncertainty whatsoever. Technology 2, however, which we shall suppose to correspond to a newly available potential innovation, fails completely in state 2. 22 Let " 2 [0; 1] index both time and the level of certainty about technology 2. At time ", uncertainty is generated by the information correspondence ¡ " with MÄ obius inverse m " such that m " (f1g) = 3" 4 , m " (f2g) = " It is easily checked that ¡ " 0 (s) µ ¡ " (s) for all s when " 0 > ". Hence, as " increases, uncertainty reduces. In the limit { when " = 1 { uncertainty vanishes, as ¡ 1 induces a unique probability: m 1 (f1g) = 3 4 and m 1 (f2g) = 1 4 . The innovative technology 2 is \successful" in the sense that its limiting expected revenue exceeds that of technology 1:
which strictly exceeds R 1 for all ± 1 and ± 2 = 1 2 ¡ ± 1 . For each ", the economy has a unique innovation-proof equilibrium, as we shortly verify. This allows us to study the process of di®usion. Beginning with " = 0, we show that some agents do choose to innovate (operate technology 2). We assume that this releases information, causing " to rise over time. We may then examine how the equilibrium changes as this uncertainty is gradually reduced. As we shall see, a rich di®usion structure emerges. 23 Initially, only Bulls enter industry 2, both as¯rm owners and wage-earners. We may think of these initial entrants as small-scale start-ups, in which all¯rm participants face considerablē nancial uncertainty. The culture of the¯rms in these infant industries is optimistic, both workers and bosses share the optimistic belief that their°edgling product is bound for greatness, and both share expected revenues equally. We label such a¯rm entrepreneurial.
A recent PBS television special \Triumph of the Nerds: The Rise of Accidental Empires" charted the di®usion of PCs. An early participant in the industry commented: \Most of the people in the industry (at that time) were young because the guys who had any real experience were too smart to get involved in all these crazy little machines." 24 After some time, these entrepreneurial enterprises release su±cient information to attract bears into the industry {¯rst as workers, and later as¯rm owners. As uncertainty falls below a critical level, the possibility of operating industry 2¯rms along more corporate lines, with uncertainty-averse workers enjoying reasonable¯nancial security, emerges. This gives¯rm owners in the new sector access to a large, and relatively cheap, workforce, providing additional stimulus to innovation. This spurt in di®usion may be interpreted as the steep portion of the S-shaped empirical di®usion curve, and corresponds to Schumpeter's \swarm" of conservative imitators.
To make good on these claims, let us¯rst observe that the absence of uncertainty in industry 1 implies that any participant in that industry { either¯rm owner or wage earner { will obtain exactly 1 2 R 1 (µ; ±) = 5 ¡ ± 1
For industry 2 we have
and
23 Note that while our analysis is essentially a comparative static exercise, it may be shown to be equivalent to a dynamic model where agents are forward looking.
24 Transcript available on http://www.pbs.org/nerds/.
for all ± and all ", so there is always an occupational option in industry 2 that Bulls strictly prefer to either occupation in industry 1. Hence, in equilibrium, all Bulls must be in industry 2, which implies ± 2¸® 2 . Therefore, the economy is gaining experience of industry 2 continuously from time " = 0, justifying our use of " to index both time and the degree of uncertainty reduction. Conversely, from (7) and (9), it is clear that initially, when " is near zero, no bears occupy roles in industry 2. In particular, if " = 0, it is clear that the unique innovation-proof equilibrium has all Bulls in industry 2 and all bears in industry 1. High uncertainty is particularly attractive to Bulls, because of the potential it allows for high rewards. For bears, on the other hand, it conveys only the perils of possible disaster. As uncertainty reduces (" rises), Bullish dreams of untold riches are forced within more realistic bounds, while bearish anxieties are alleviated. Hence, the former group become less sanguine about the opportunities in industry 2, while the latter become less averse to participating in innovative enterprises.
In order to describe the equilibria for " > 0, let us de¯ne the following three functions. First, de¯ne w 2 (± 2 ; ") as the wage in industry 2 at which Bulls are indi®erent between¯rm ownership and wage-laboring in industry 2. In other words, w 2 (± 2 ; ") is the solution to 25
Since the left-hand side exceeds 1, we must have w 2¸1 to satisfy (10). It is also clearly necessary that w 2 · 21 ¡ 4± 2 . Therefore, if (10) holds, w 2 is fully paid in state µ = 1, and workers receive $1 in state µ = 2. Hence:
If w 2 > w 2 (± 2 ; "), then neither type wishes to own a¯rm in industry 2. This is incompatible with equilibrium, since we already know that ± 2¸® 2 . Hence w 2 · w 2 (± 2 ; "). We next derive a lower bound for w 2 . De¯ne w(± 1 ; ") as the wage at which bears are indi®erent between owning a¯rm and laboring in industry 2. Thus, w(± 1 ; ") solves
If w 2 < 1, then bears will strictly prefer an occupation in industry 1 to wage-laboring in industry 2, so we shall assume for the purposes of solving (12) that w 2¸1 . In this case,
25 Equation (10) follows by the logic leading to equation (5) in the proof of Lemma 4.1.
so (12) implies
If w 2 < w 2 (± 2 ; "), then neither type will accept a wage earning position in a¯rm in industry 2. Therefore, w 2¸w 2 (± 2 ; ") in equilibrium. Finally, de¯neŵ 2 (± 2 ; ") to be the wage at which bears are indi®erent between working in industry 1 and accepting a wage-earning position in industry 2. That is,ŵ 2 (± 2 ; ") solves
(using the assumption w 2¸1 as before). Solving (14) giveŝ
Figure 1 graphs these three functions for given ± 2 . Observe that for each ± 2 , there is a unique " 0 for which w 2 (± 2 ; " 0 ) =ŵ 2 (± 2 ; " 0 ), and a unique " 1 > " 0 for whichŵ 2 (± 2 ; " 1 ) = w 2 (± 2 ; " 1 ).
Recall that w 2 (± 2 ; ") · w 2 · w 2 (± 2 ; ") in equilibrium. Let us consider three exhaustive cases: (i) w 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 < w 2 (± 2 ; "), (ii) w 2 = w 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 (± 2 ; "), and (iii) w 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 (± 2 ; ") = w 2 .
If w 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 < w 2 (± 2 ; "), then all Bulls wish to own¯rms in industry 2. Equilibrium therefore requires that bears are happy to work in these¯rms. Since¯rm ownership in industry 2 is not optimal for bears, and ® < 1 2 , some bears must remain in industry 1. Therefore, we must have w 2 =ŵ 2 (± 2 ; ") so that bears are indi®erent between industry 1 occupations and wage-earning in industry 2. Thus, case (i) requires w 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 =ŵ 2 (± 2 ; ") < w 2 (± 2 ; ")
Next take case (ii). Once again, all Bulls are owners of industry 2¯rms. Now bears are equally happy owning or working in such¯rms. Since some bearish workers are necessary, we must have w 2¸ŵ2 (± 2 ; "). Thus, case (ii) requireŝ
Finally, in case (iii), any bears in industry 2 are workers, while Bulls are indi®erent between the two industry 2 occupations. Since ® < 1 2 , we cannot have all bears in industry 2, so it is necessary that w 2 ·ŵ 2 (± 2 ; "). Hence:
Combining (16){ (18) with Figure 1 , we see that for each (±; "), there is a unique candidate equilibrium value for w 2 . This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Thus, given ± 2 , if " · " 0 , then w 2 = w 2 (± 2 ; "). In other words, if uncertainty is very high (i.e. early on in the di®usion process), then bears are unwilling to enter industry 2, so w 2 must leave Bulls indi®erent between ownership and wage-labor in industry 2. Also, it is clear that ± 2 = ® 2 in this case.
As uncertainty falls to " 2 (" 0 ; " 1 ), bears become attracted by the industry 2 wage. Since they are not yet emboldened su±ciently to own¯rms in industry 2, some bears must remain in industry 1, so w 2 =ŵ 2 (± 2 ; "). Access to this comparatively cheaper bearish labor force causes wages to drop more sharply during this phase of di®usion. Bulls are an expensive labor force because of their perceived lucrative outside opportunity as owners in industry 2. Since bears are less optimistic about the returns to this occupation, they have a lower reservation wage. Over this phase, ± 2 2 ¡ ® 2 ; ® ¢ . Finally, when "¸" 1 , uncertainty { and wages { have become so low that bears are happy to own industry 2¯rms. Since a labor force is still required, we must have w 2 = w 2 (± 2 ; ") in equilibrium. Over this¯nal phase, ± 2 2 £ ®;
1 2 ¤ , and wages are rising. This represents the maturity of the new industry, as its comparative advantage over the old industry 1 is revealed, and the increasing expected returns must be shared with the labor force.
The foregoing description of the di®usion process is broadly accurate, but some details remain to be tidied. Figure 2 is drawn for given ± 2 , while ± 2 is clearly changing, at least through the last two phases of the process. Our equilibrium reasoning must take this into account. In fact, doing so changes matters only slightly: there is period between phases 2 and 3 at which ± 2 = ® is constant. Once density ® of bears are working in industry 2, time must pass and uncertainty reduce further before bears become happy to own such¯rms and the next phase can begin. Figures 3{5 illustrate the complete equilibrium analysis. Figure 5 we may discern the basis for an S-shaped di®usion curve. The°at portion in the middle, where ± 2 = ®, is largely an artefact of our assuming only two types of agent. In reality, many will exist, with Bulls and bears occupying the two extremes of the spectrum. Adding in these additional types is likely to smooth the curve into an S. Initially, a small group of the most optimistic entrepreneurial types will test the waters, and di®usion will accelerate only once uncertainty has reduced enough that the bulk of the economy's more conservative agents are su±ciently convinced of its value. Observe that as this happens, the character of industry 2¯rms will change. It will no longer be necessary to employ potential entrepreneurs in these¯rms, as in the early stages of innovation. Instead, a larger labor force, made up of uncertainty-averse individuals after steady, secure jobs, will become available. These will be employed in preference to optimists, as they are cheaper. Firms in the innovative sector mature from entrepreneurial operations, to corporate enterprises. As potential entrepreneurs are relieved of having to be workers, di®usion now proceeds apace. Eventually some¯rms in the new sector become bureaucratic, with bears employing bears.
It is also worth noting that at time " = 0, when innovation¯rst takes place, there is likely to be a sudden change in the character of¯rms in the old industry. Were we to introduce a small amount of uncertainty in these¯rms, then we would observe Bulls (mostly) employing bears in this industry prior to the arrival of the second technology. When the new technology arrives at " = 0, all the Bulls switch to the new sector. This forces more bears to take on ownership roles in the original sector, so these¯rms switch from corporate to bureaucratic. In this sense, then, the innovation process cannot be viewed as the di®usion of¯rms from one sector to another. Crucially, innovation involves the break-up of existing¯rms and the re-constitution of new ones. If ® is near 1 2 , then prior to " = 0, almost all¯rms have optimistic objective functions; but at " = 0, less then half do.
Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper is to exhibit a simple framework that embodies the notion of entrepreneurial innovation, motivated by the recognition that many important innovations have been initiated by individuals, not¯rms. Both Gates and Ford, as individuals, held optimistic beliefs about their respective industries, and built¯rms to pursue their vision. To talk of Microsoft moving into the software market, or Ford moving into the motor vehicle market is meaningless. Yet, this is exactly how the formal economic models treat innovation { as à hard-headed' sideways shift by an existing¯rm into a new and uncertain industry.
Where uncertainty predominates, and there are limitations on the ability of the entrepreneur to shield workers from this uncertainty,¯rms' objectives ought to be treated as endogenous. Thē rm captures more than simply a production technology: it is also a mechanism for resolving di®erence in attitudes to uncertainty. When an industry is very new and uncertainty is high, both workers and owners share the same uncertainty attitude. As uncertainty is resolved, there are gains from trading across di®erences in attitude to uncertainty. Therefore, the nature of the¯rm is shown to change with the maturation of the industry. It is this change in the nature of the¯rm in the face of resolving uncertainty that creates the S-shaped di®usion curve in our model.
The PC industry is an excellent example of this process of di®usion and maturation. The early innovators were optimistic entrepreneurs who worked in small partnerships. In the late seventies, the large established IBM eventually recognized the potential in the PC and developed the IBM acorn. This computer was launched in 1981. IBM predicted that it would sell half a million by 1984. It sold 2 million! A Properties of the correspondence » To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 it is su±cient to show that the correspondence » is upper hemi-continuous (u.h.c.) , and has non-empty, compact and convex values. It will then follow by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem that » has a¯xed point.
In the course of the arguments, it will be necessary to consider limits of sequences of allocation functions. Although such functions are points in an in¯nite-dimensional space, the topological arguments are simpli¯ed by observing that only¯nitely many properties of these functions are relevant to the analysis.
Given any allocation function Á, de¯ne the following 4I (Lebesgue) measurable sets:
These sets identify the agents of each type assigned to each of the 2I occupations by Á. For our purposes, the relevant features of Á are simply the Lebesgue measures of these sets. In particular, we need to know whether or not Á is consistent with some given (w; ±); and the implied total densities of agents in each occupation. We shall therefore associate with each Á a¯nite vector t(Á) which will summarize these properties. Each t(Á) will be a vector in
In particular, t(Á) =t 2 T if and only if
i 8i 2 f2I + 2; 2I + 3; : : : ; 4I + 1g
Conversely, given any t 2 T , we may construct an allocation function Á [t] as follows:
where i ¤ = min fi j t i+1 > ®g. It should be clear that, for every i 2 O
Let us now return to our consideration of the properties of ». Firstly, it is obvious that:
Lemma A.1 »(w; ±; x) 6 = ; for every (w; ±; x) 2 D.
We next show:
Lemma A.2 »(w; ±; x) is compact for every (w; ±; x) 2 D.
Proof. Boundedness is immediate, so it su±ces to prove closedness. The sets ( arg max
and fproj ¡I xg are clearly closed; so we need only consider X(w; ±). Let fx n g 1 n=1 be a sequence in X(w; ±) with limit x. Then
is a sequence in Z(w; ±) with limit z = C ¡1 x. Associated with each z n will be an allocation function Á n 2 ©(w; ±) such that
Consider the sequence ft(Á n )g 1 n=1 in T . Since T is clearly compact, this has a convergent subsequence with limit t 2 T . If we can show that
then the lemma is proved. Suppose that (15) does not hold. Then, there must exist some k 2 fB; bg and some i 2 O such that i 6 2 BR E;k (w; ±) and Leb
Consider the case k = B (the argument is similar if k = b). Then for some i 6 2 BR E;B (w; ±)
we have
> 0 for su±ciently large n along the subsequence de¯ning t. But this contradicts the fact that Á n 2 ©(w; ±) for all n. Hence, (15) must hold.
To see (16), suppose that m indexes the subsequence de¯ning t. Then
and (16) and fproj ¡I xg are obviously convex. Letx;x 2 X(w; ±) and consider
for some¸2 (0; 1). De¯neẑ = C ¡1x ,z = C ¡1x , and
LetÁ andÁ be allocation functions in ©(w; ±) satisfyinĝ
Now observe that T is a convex set, and hence consider the t 2 T de¯ned as
it is obvious that Á [t] 2 ©(w; ±). We now deduce that for every
Thence z 2 Z(w; ±) and the proof is complete. 
there is a convergent subsequence of fx n g 1 n=1 with limit in X(w; ±). Let f(w; ±) n g 1 n=1 , (w; ±), and fx n g 1 n=1 satisfy the conditions of the preceding paragraph. De¯ne the sequence
and let fÁ n g 1 n=1 be an associated sequence of allocation functions. Then the sequence
has a convergent subsequence with limit t 2 T . We claim that Á [ t ] 2 ©(w; ±). To see this, observe that the correspondences BR E;B and BR E;b are clearly upper hemi-continuous by the continuity of each type's objective function in (w; ±). In particular, the Choquet integral is continuous, as is clear from equation (1). Therefore, if 1 · i · 2I and i 6 2 BR E;B (w; ±), then it must also be the case that i 6 2 BR E;B (w n ; ± n ) for all su±ciently large n. Hence, we cannot have t i+1 > t i . Analogous conclusions hold for 2I + 1 · i · 4I and (i ¡ 2I) 6 2 BR E;b (w; ±). So
as claimed.
Finally, to complete the proof of the lemma, we must show that
But this may be seen as follows:
This completes the proof. 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
The following Lemma is useful as preliminary result.
Lemma A.5 Suppose economy E is such that the information correspondence ¡ induces upper and lower probabilities v and v having the following property:
Then, any equilibrium of E is innovation-proof.
Proof: Suppose that (w; ±; Á) is an equilibrium of E. Suppose further that there exists an industry i with ± i = 0, such that a wageŵ i¸0 and agents k; k 0 2 [0; 1], k 6 = k 0 , may be found satisfying
with at least one strict inequality. Wage rate b w i must be di®erent from w i since otherwise (w; ±; Á) would not have been an equilibrium in the¯rst place. Suppose thatŵ i > w i . In this case, we claim that agent k cannot be strictly better o® after the re-allocation. This is because occupation 2i ¡ 1 was weakly less desirable to agent k than k's occupation under Á when¯rm owners in industry i had to pay wage w i . Therefore, owning a¯rm in industry i and paying the strictly higher wageŵ i cannot make k strictly better o® than in the original equilibrium. Therefore
Since R i (µ; ±) ¡ min fc; R i (µ; ±)g and min fc; R i (µ; ±)g are comonotonic in µ for any c 2 R + , we may conclude that ([?])
for any c 2 R + . Therefore, (21) implies
which in turn implies v k (fµ 2 £ j R i (µ; ±) > w i g) = 0
Because k 0 must be strictly better o® under the reallocation, we have E v k 0 [min fw i ; R i (µ; ±)g] · y E;¯k0 (w; ±) < E v k 0 [min fŵ i ; R i (µ; ±)g]
and hence v k 0 (fµ 2 £ j R i (µ; ±) > w i g) > 0
But (22) and (23) imply that v k = v (i.e.¯k = b) and v k 0 = v (i.e.¯k0 = B). Thus, we have a contradiction to the assumption of the lemma. The caseŵ i < w i yields a contradiction by an analogous argument. 2
Corollary A.1 Suppose economy E is such that the information correspondence ¡ induces the lower probability v whose MÄ obius inverse m satis¯es m(fµg) > 0 8µ 2 £ Then, any equilibrium of E is innovation-proof.
The assumption on m implies v(E) > 0 for all E 2 P ¤ (£) and the result follows from Lemma 4.1. Each f 2 M is the MÄ obius inverse of some lower probability on (£; P(£)); conversely, each lower probability on (£; P(£)) has a MÄ obius inverse in M (see Shafer (1976) ). We may identify M with the unit simplex ¢ jP ¤ (£)j¡1 . In particular, M is compact and convex. Choose some1 2 ri[core(v)]. Then,1(E) = v(E) if and only if v(E) = v(E), and1(E) > v(E) otherwise. In particular, lettingm 2 M denote the MÄ obius inverse of1, we must havẽ m(fµg) > 0 for every µ 2 £ by our non-redundancy assumption.
Now let us de¯ne
The sequence fm n g 1 n=1 in M clearly converges to m and satis¯es m n (fµg) > 0 for every µ 2 £. If fv n g 1 n=1 is the associated sequence of lower probabilities, then v n ! v as n ! 1, and for each n v n (E)¸v(E) 8E µ £ >From v n we may construct the associated upper probability v n as follows (see Dempster (1967) ):
For each n, de¯ne E n as the economy with identical ® and revenue functions to E, but in which Bulls evaluate their employment options using the capacity v n , and bears evaluate their options using the capacity v n . For the purposes of the following argument it is unnecessary to de¯ne a sequence of information correspondences generating these beliefs. By Corollary 4.1, each E n has an innovation-proof equilibrium (w n ; ± n ; Á n ). Let (w; ±; t) denote the limit of a convergent subsequence of f(w n ; ± n ; t (Á n ))g 1 n=1 (retaining n as index of the convergent subsequence for notational convenience). We claim that ¡ w; ±; Á [t] ¢ is an innovation-proof equilibrium of E.
For every i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ig, note that similarly. So Á [t] clears all labor markets and generates industry density vector ±.
To complete the proof it su±ces to show that Á [t] 2 ©(w; ±), and that (w; ±; Á [t] ) is innovation-proof. Agents of type¯2 fB; bg have objective functions which are continuous in (w n ; ± n ; v n ), where v n denotes type¯'s belief capacity (recall (1) and Assumption 3). Hence 8¯2 fB; bg lim sup n!1 BR E n ;¯( w n ; ± n ) µ BR E;¯( w; ±)
If t i+1 ¡ t i > 0 for some i 6 2 BR E;B (w; ±), then t n i+1 ¡ t n i > 0 must also hold for su±ciently large n. Furthermore, if t 2I+i+1 ¡ t 2I+i > 0 for some i 6 2 BR E;b (w; ±), then again t n 2I+i+1 ¡ t n 2I+i > 0 must also hold for su±ciently large n. In each case we have a contradiction to Á n 2 ©(w n ; ± n ). Hence, Á [t] 2 ©(w; ±).
Suppose that ¡ w; ±; Á [t] ¢ is not innovation-proof. That is, there exist agents k and k 0 , an industry i with ± i = 0, and a wageŵ i such that if k owns a¯rm in industry i and employs k 0 as a worker atŵ i , both do as well as under the candidate equilibrium, and at least one of them does strictly better. Suppose agent k does strictly better (the argument is similar if we choose k 0 instead). Then E v k [R i (µ; ±) ¡ min fŵ i ; R i (µ; ±)g] > y E;¯k (w; ±)
where¯k and v k are k's type and belief capacity respectively. Clearly, it must be the case that w i >ŵ i . Furthermore, (7) and the fact that In particular, we must have v k 0´v and m(B) = 0 8B µ fµ 2 £ j R i (µ; ±) >ŵ i g 6 = ;
Recalling that v n¸v , we deduce [min fw i ; R i (µ; ± n )g] ¡ y E n ;¯k0 (w n ; ± n )¸E v k 0 [min fw i ; R i (µ; ±)g] ¡ y E;¯k0 (w; ±)
for all su±ciently large n, using the continuity of the functions on the left-hand side of the inequality. Therefore, for all large n,
[min fw n i ; R i (µ; ± n )g] ¡ y E n ;¯k0 (w n ; ± n ) > E v k 0 [min fw i ; R i (µ; ±)g] ¡ y E;¯k0 (w; ±)
since E v n k 0
[min fc; R i (µ; ± n )g] is strictly increasing in c at c =w i when n is su±ciently large. But observe that the right-hand side of this inequality is equal to zero, so
[min fw n i ; R i (µ; ± n )g] > y E n ;¯k0 (w n ; ± n ) which is a contradiction. This completes the proof. 2
